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The Work Incentive Years in Current Perspective:
What Have We Learned? Where Do We
Go From Here?*
LEONARD GOODWIN
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Department of Social Science & Policy Studies
A review of the rationale, results, and research findings from work-
training efforts for welfare recipients is presented. Focus is on the Work
Incentive (WIN) Program from its inception in 1968 to its heydays in
the 1970s and its decline during the Reagan era. The review provides
a basis for examining the recent welfare legislation and recongizing the
elements needed for real welfare reform.
While the War on Poverty and The Great Society efforts cap-
tured headlines during the 1960s, there were other efforts afoot
to help the poor. One of these was the Work Incentive (WIN)
Program. It was charged with helping welfare recipients achieve
economic independence through work. This paper examines the
assumptions, activities, and results of the WIN Program. The
task proves extremely useful because extensive, if unpublicized,
efforts were made to achieve program goals and extensive re-
search was carried out on these efforts. Reviewing the heydays
of WIN from today's perspective permits a cogent analysis of the
new welfare legislation.
The paper begins by placing the assumptions and operations
of WIN within a pre-WIN context. There follows a review of
WIN and related efforts from 1967 until the beginning of the
Reagan Administration in 1981. The next section examines in
more detail what was learned from the WIN experience, drawing
upon research and evaluation studies. Brief examination of work-
training for welfare recipients from 1981 to the present comes
*Initial draft presented in Jackson, Mississippi, March 4, 1988 at a confer-
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next, leading to a discussion of what is now known about train-
ing welfare recipients. The next section comments on current
welfare reform, and the last section summarizes the general
findings and conclusions of the paper.
WIN And Its Precursors
The first federally sponsored effort to help welfare recipients
came in 1935 in the Social Security Act. The provisions for public
welfare, unlike the major provisions of the Act, were aimed at
supporting widowed mothers with small children, irrespective
of their work history. The other provisions for Unemployment
Insurance and Social Security were aimed at helping persons
who had worked but had lost their jobs or had retired.
Over the years the work-related programs were readily ac-
cepted and expanded. The welfare program has been less fa-
vored. Its first serious review came after the Kennedy election
of 1960. This review revealed that welfare recipients were no
longer primarily mothers who had become widowed, but moth-
ers who had never been married. Welfare was being given to
mothers who had not had a relatively stable life in a traditional
two-parent family, but seemed in some way to have created
their own difficulties by having children out of wedlock.
The 1962 Public Welfare Amendments sanctioned efforts to
provide counselling to welfare families in order that they might
improve their social/psychological stability and lead out of the
welfare syndrome. Also sanctioned were $2 million in demon-
stration funds for Community Work and Training projects (CWT)
to help recipients achieve training and work that would lead to
economic independence.
In 1963 $50 million were allocated to CWT projects. In 1964,
President Johnson proposed and Sargent Shriver incorporated
into Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act $150 million for
work-training programs that had much more liberal require-
ments as to residence and who was qualified to participate than
the CWT projects. All these programs were based in the federal
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). They did
not receive a great deal of attention in or out of Congress because
they could not compare in glamor to the major "war on poverty"
programs, e.g., Job Corps, VISTA, Community Action.
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The important point is that the programs for welfare recip-
ients were designed to get the recipients off the welfare rolls.
While there was an intent to help people, the underlying reason
for the programs was to lower welfare costs. The other programs
in the Social Security Act of 1935 had a rather different rationale.
Unemployment Insurance and Social Security were paid to per-
sons who had "earned" their right to the payments. These were
programs not designed to support people who had not paid
their own way, but to provide more security for those who had
paid their way in the past.
This difference in rationale helps account for the different
attitudes and actions of policymakers regarding the two sets of
programs. As evidence mounted on the ineffectiveness of CWT
and Title V programs in lowering welfare rolls, members of
Congress became dissatisfied. A paper summarizing the
achievement of Title V showed that from 1964 to 1969 about
228,000 people had been in the program for an average of 7
months. About 35% of those found immediate employment upon
leaving the program. But only 24% of all entrants to the program
were known to be working 35 hours or more per week after 3
months. The average pay for the full-time workers was about
$1.80 per hour. These results were disappointing given that the
number of welfare families had risen from one million to 1.7
million during that period.
Part of the blame for the lackluster results of Title V was
attributed to the location of the program's administration in HEW
and welfare departments around the country rather than in the
Department of Labor (DOL) and employment services that were
more familiar with job training and placement. Upon amending
the Social Socurity Act in 1967 Congress established an even
more elaborate work-training program called the Work Incentive
(WIN) Program (Conference Report on Social Security Amend-
ments of 1967). Major authority for developing guidelines was
shifted from HEW to DOL. The delivery of services was now to
be provided by local employment service agencies. The local
welfare agencies were still to screen welfare recipients for eli-
gibility for WIN and to provide child care.
Special counsellors and manpower specialists were to be
provided by the local employment services to help WIN partic-
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ipants obtain better training and make a better adaptation to
the job market than occurred in earlier programs. Money was
provided for some participants to go into on-the-job training or
into public service employment. Day care funds also were avail-
able. Hence WIN brought together all the facilities offered in
previous efforts, ranging from personal counselling to training
for jobs. WIN went into operation toward the end of 1968.
Between August 1968 and April 1970 about 1.6 million wel-
fare cases eligible for WIN participation were reviewed by local
welfare departments across the country. These cases included
father in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unem-
ployed Parent (AFDC-U) program as well as out-of-school teen-
agers receiving AFDC. However, the vast majority were AFDC
mothers.
Only about 10% of the 1.6 million eligibles were considered
suitable for enrollment in WIN. Of those terminated from WIN
in 1970 only about 20% had held jobs for at least 3 months.
Hence, during a period of 20 months when the welfare rolls rose
about 40% to almost 8 million persons, WIN was successful in
obtaining stable jobs for only 2% (20% of 10%) of the total
eligible welfare population. The median wage for employed WIN
mothers was approximately $2 per hour, hardly sufficient to sup-
port adequately a family of four.
Out in the field, many WIN participants were being held in
remedial education longer than anticipated. That is, the educa-
tional level of many applicants was so low as to require more
educational time in order to bring them to a level where they
might be trained for higher level jobs. This longer-term educa-
tion and training markedly depressed the rate of job placement
and failed to lower the welfare rolls.
The lack of success, in terms of lowering welfare rolls, was
not lost upon Russell Long, powerful chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee responsible for WIN legislation. He severely
criticized DOL for failure to administer the program properly,
failing to enforce the rules of removing from the welfare rolls
those who refused to participate in WIN. Behind this concern
of Senator Long's was the belief that welfare people might be
lazy, not want to work, and so had to be strongly prodded into
the training programs and jobs (Goodwin, 1975, pp. 83-90).
In December 1971, Senator Talmadge, also on the Finance
WIN
Committee, amended the WIN legislation to insure greater work
force participation of welfare recipients (Public Law 92-223).
Training of recipients was to be lowered in favor of immediate
job placement in whatever jobs were available. There were to
be more stringent penalties against welfare recipients who re-
fused for no good cause to participate in the program. The
amendments went into effect in July 1972.
Subsequent years showed a marked increase in WIN job
placements. During fiscal year 1975 approximately 839,000 wel-
fare recipients were deemed eligible for WIN. About 113,000 of
these people obtained unsubsidized jobs for at least 90 days.
Thus, a little more than 13% of the eligible group were placed.
This was a substantial jump over the 2 % of earlier years, but
was not very significant compared to the 3.5 million adults who
were on welfare at that time (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976,
p. 3).
Additional modifications were made to WIN in 1975. The
WIN sponsor, usually the state employment service, became re-
sponsible for WIN registration (rather than the welfare office).
This was a further step to convert WIN almost wholly to a place-
ment rather than a training program. On the other hand, train-
ing objectives were to be attained by having this agency
coordinate WIN activities with such programs as those offered
through the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA).
Effectiveness of WIN in lowering welfare rolls did not in-
crease markedly. During 1981, for example, 1,156,000 persons
were new registrants in WIN, and 310,000, or almost 27%, ob-
tained employment for 30 days or more. However, there were
a total of 3,800,000 welfare families at that time. Thus, jobs were
found for less than 10% of heads of welfare households. More-
over, the average earnings of the welfare mothers was only $3.70
per hour and for the fathers only $5.01 per hour (U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, 1982, pp. 43, 45). That level of income is hardly
suited to supporting a family of three or four at the poverty
level. (If there were a two parent family and both parents worked,
then there would be some possibility of leaving poverty and
welfare.) These data underline the small impact of the WIN effort
on the welfare rolls.
This thumbnail historical review of the WIN program, may
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leave the impression that WIN has been just another bureau-
cratic effort of limited success. What makes WIN of special in-
terest is that a proportion of its budget was legislated for research
and evaluation, and that the federal WIN Office (in the Employ-
ment and Training Administration of the Department of Labor)
was directed by Merwin Hans. He had a strong commitment to
discover through social science research how WIN efforts could
be improved. What follows is an outline of certain research ef-
forts which illuminate the issue of training welfare recipients
for work.
What Has Been Learned From WIN 1968-1981
In order to adequately understand the performance of WIN
or any program, it is necessary to recognize the social systems
that affect it and which it affects. Figure 1 shows the systems
involved in the national effort. At the top is the Donor System,
the Congress and Executive Office which mandate the operation
of a national program, set the broad boundaries and purposes
of operation. The legislation is handed to the Federal Adminis-
trative System, for example, the Department of Labor in order
to establish specific guidelines for the operation of the program.
These federal guidelines go to the State Administrative Sys-
tems where the guidelines are related to state conditions and
then are passed down to local Delivery Systems that actually
deliver the services intended. The Recipient System consists of
persons who use the services. There are three further systems
of great importance. One of these is the Job Market, which de-
termines what kinds of jobs are available for what wages. A
second one is the Family/Community System which consists of
the family members, friends and other social networks of Re-
cipient System persons. The third system is the Constituencies
of the Donor System, the voters and special interest groups that
affect the continuation in office of donor system members.
What this Figure helps emphasize is the complex interplay
of people and social systems that goes into the operation of any
national program. The effectiveness of any program can be
doomed from the beginning by failure of donor system mem-
bers to recognize the realities in other important systems (which
is a reason for holding public hearings on legislative proposals).
WIN
Figure 1. Systems affecting the WIN Program
Donor System
(Executive Office/
Constituency Congress)
System I
Federal Administrative
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4State Administrative
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In the case of WIN, there was strong suspicion on the part
of certain powerful members of the donor system that members
of the recipient system did not wish to work and get off welfare.
Hence, one useful area of research could be determination of the
attitudes of welfare recipients: did these recipients have the
work ethic, did they prefer welfare to work? A related area could
be determination of the employability characteristics of recipi-
ents, e.g., level of education, job experience, relative to job mar-
ket demands.
A series of studies were commissioned by the WIN office to
examine the characteristics of members of the recipient system
and determine how these affected the goal of getting recipients
into jobs and off welfare (Goodwin, 1977, pp. 5-11). Two of the
studies involved large scale surveys of the attitudes and char-
acteristics of welfare recipients in general, WIN participants in
particular, and various middle class comparison groups (Good-
win, 1972, 1983).
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Among the conclusions drawn from these several studies
was that welfare recipients along with other Americans tended
to have a strong work ethic, wanted to work, and when feasible
did work. No study revealed a significant segment of the Amer-
ican population that preferred indolence to work. And no study
was able to identify a group of persons with the same charac-
teristics as welfare recipients but managing to get by without
welfare. Substantial barriers were found in the way of welfare
recipients' participating in the job market. These included lack
of skills, poor health, need for child care, and lack of jobs at
which they could earn enough to support their families above
the poverty level (Goodwin, 1977, p. 2).
Several large scale studies were funded in order to determine
which aspects of the WIN program, e.g., the orientation, edu-
cational component, work-training component, led to success in
terms of job placement. These studies gathered data over time
across many sites. There seemed to be higher rates of success
among recipients who received some form of WIN service, rather
than just placed directly in jobs (as encouraged by the Talmadge
Amendments and the administrative changes of 1975).
Identification of just which services contributed to success
was not clear, probably because of difficulties in taking account
of differences in programs and job markets across diverse sites.
These studies were precursors to a subsequent major, sophis-
ticated effort at identifying factors that made some programs
more successful than others.
Mitchell, Chadwin, and Nightingale (1980) gathered data
from 43 WIN sites in 10 states. Through interviews with officials
and reading documents they arrived at four basic aims or criteria
of success for the WIN program. Their task, then, was to meas-
ure these criteria at the different sites and find the other variables
that would explain them. The basic criteria (the dependent vari-
ables in their study) were: number of job entries per staff, av-
erage job entry wage, retention rate, average monthly welfare
grant reduction.
The predictors of these outcome criteria were far ranging,
and therein lies the importance of the study. The authors con-
sidered issues in the State Administrative System, the Delivery
System, the Job Market, as well as certain background charac-
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teristics of Recipients. They found for example, that the extent
of local employment growth and presence of low wage industries
in the Job Market System was significantly related to average
entry level wage of WIN persons.
They found that bureaucratic-political activities at the state
level did not affect performance at the local level. However, the
more the State Administrative System emphasized training for
staff, the greater the success of local programs. The more that
local WIN offices (the Delivery System) dealt directly and openly
with conflict within the unit, and the more flexibility within the
unit combined with more accountability the greater the success
of the offices.
At the level of the Recipient System, they found that insti-
tutional training was more effective with certain clients than
others. Richer mixes of supportive services and more client-ori-
ented job development went with greater success. By casting
their research net broadly, these researches were able to illu-
minate the ways in which different social systems contributing
to the WIN operation could improve their operation and achieve
the stated goals. As useful as the study and the suggestions
were, they were not able to revolutionize the effectiveness of
WIN. There was no simple way to affect the job market system
relative to recipient characteristics in order to move massive
numbers of recipients into the work force.
The Washington WIN office under Merwin Hans not only
supported research projects, but encouraged forms of action re-
search involving members of the Delivery System in novel ac-
tivities. Thus in 1972 Hans encouraged a proposal to test the
giving of vouchers to WIN participants so that they could choose
their own training programs. The idea was that welfare recipi-
ents would have greater commitment to and get more from a
training program when they themselves could choose and pay
for that program themselves (using the voucher).
The use of vouchers was tested by having the WIN office in
Portland, Oregon administer them. Fears that the use of vouch-
ers would result in totally impractical training purchases proved
unfounded. However, the impact of vouchers on subsequent em-
ployment had mixed effects. The vouchers increased the em-
ployability of some WIN participants, relative to a comparison
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group. For other participants, the voucher seemed to decrease
their employability relative to a comparison group. The study
highlighted the fact of individual differences among WIN par-
ticipants (Goodwin & Milius, 1978, p. 21). It also highlighted
the extreme difficulty of trying to develop research efforts with
participation of the Delivery System members. Staff turnover in
the local offices, changes in regulations, and differences in per-
ception between staff members and researchers make any such
effort difficult at best (Richardson & Sharp, 1974). Further use
of vouchers on any kind of large scale was not pursued.
At the same time, Hans recognized that if a local WIN office
became involved in research on a procedure it thought impor-
tant, that procedure had a good chance of being adopted by the
office and perhaps other offices across the country. With that in
mind, and with a proposed research agenda which he had com-
missioned (Goodwin, 1976), Hans proceeded with establishing
four local WIN offices as laboratories for testing the usefulness
of new procedures suggested by the offices. The Manpower
Development Research Corporation (MDRC) was designated as
the agent to carry out the action research efforts, which began
in 1977.
The site in Louisville tested the effectiveness of job search
in increasing employment. The site in Denver tested the impact
of working more closely with welfare recipients who volun-
teered to enter WIN. The St. Louis site worked at trying to es-
tablish a connection between WIN trainees and small business
efforts. The combined sites at Madison and Racine, Wisconsin
were to test the use of a monetarily enriched on-the-job training
effort (Leiman, 1982).
The usual difficulties in attempting action research in a com-
plex system were also encountered here, including the problem
of WIN staff turnover (which made agreements about goals and
procedures problematical when new staff arrived) and differ-
ences in viewpoints and interests between staff and researchers.
Also, the imaginativeness of the projects presented by the op-
erating offices was very limited.
Only the Louisville effort showed any positive gain in em-
ployment for WIN participants. That is, greater effort put into
WIN
job search increased employment. The idea of continuing the
laboratory effort was not met with enthusiasm by any of the
parties, and so it was not continued after 1981.
The importance of these lab efforts is not in the usability of
the research results, but in the illumination of how research can
or cannot be integrated into operating programs. Further illu-
mination along this line was generated from a series of three
ethnographic studies of WIN sites.
The idea of combining ethnographic, qualitative, research
with quantitative research was in Goodwin's research program
proposal (1976) that Hans commissioned. Unfortunately, per-
sonality conflicts developed between the leader of the ethno-
graphic effort and the administrator of MDRC who was
responsible for the effort (Vivelo, 1980). Nevertheless, this kind
of effort again pioneered an important approach, and provided
invaluable information for those concerned with understanding
what actually happens in a service organization.
It was observed, for example, how a WIN team leader placed
an illiterate mother in Unassigned Recipient status because the
team's active caseload was high and unemployment was high.
Later on, when caseloads decreased and jobs were plentiful the
mother was sent to evening literacy classes and subsequently
got a job as a presser in a manufacturing firm (Levy, 1981, 107-
108). The decisions and actions of WIN staff seem reasonable,
and highlight the real situational constraints under which WIN
staff and welfare recipients operate in specific locales.
A different demonstration project, that was successful, in-
troduced the "job dub". WIN staff at experimental sites, in 1976,
were trained to have WIN participants form support groups
around job search activities. It was found that members of these
"dubs" obtained more jobs than participants trying to get jobs
on their own (Azrin, 1978). Use of the Job Club spread to other
sites.
Many other efforts were made by the WIN Office in Wash-
ington to improve the training and job placement of welfare
recipients. Giving tax credits to employers hiring welfare recip-
ients was tried. Little success was observed (Goodwin, 1977).
The Total Registration Involvement Project (TRIP) was initiated
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in 1979. It emerged from the fact that WIN was funded at a
relatively low level, $385,000,000 at its peak in 1979 which allo-
cated an average of $259 to each person registered in WIN.
The TRIP project allocated more money to certain sites in
order to see if this increased job placements (Hans, 1979). The
General Accounting Office (GAO) in an overall evaluation of
WIN noted that TRIP increased employment of WIN partici-
pants but that the cost of service also markedly increased
(Comptroller General, 1982, p. 13). WIN's budget was on the
downturn at the time of that report and nothing happened to
extend project efforts after the demonstration was completed.
The GAO report presents results from a statistical analysis,
using WIN data, which sought to determine the factors affecting
WIN participants working their way off welfare. Their findings
indicate that economic independence goes up as there are fewer
children in the family, the WIN participant has more education,
is married, has been on welfare fewer years, and is younger
(Comptroller General, 1982, p. 54). These findings are reason-
able in that a mother with several children who has little edu-
cation, has no husband (who can help support the family or look
after the family), has been dependent on welfare a while and
out of the labor market, and is getting on in years will have
severe difficulty in working her way off welfare.
These GAO findings are sharply limited by the fact that the
investigators were using already collected data and could not
ask questions of recipients about attitudes. When this was done
in Goodwin's 1983 study of WIN participants, certain GAO find-
ings were substantiated and new findings added. Goodwin found
that length of time on welfare militated against economic in-
dependence, and that the greater the number of children in the
family the longer the time on welfare. This is consistent with the
GAO model.
Goodwin also found that previous job status, which is
strongly related to level of education, positively predicts eco-
nomic independence, as does having others in the family who
are earning money, which is another way of indicating the pres-
ence of a marital partner who is working (Goodwin, 1983,
pp. 50-51).
The further contribution of Goodwin's study was to show
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that certain psychological orientations predict economic inde-
pendence and others do not. More specificially, he found that
recipients' attitudes toward work or welfare did not predict
achievement of economic independence. The major psycholog-
ical predictor was expectation of achieving such independence.
This expectation in turn was influenced by whether one ob-
tained employment or not-going up if one got a job and down
if one failed to get a job.
Goodwin's findings in combination with the GAO's find-
ings, and in the absence of contrary findings, suggest that people
are on welfare because of inability to earn enough money in the
job market to support their families at the poverty level. More-
over, they are not on welfare because they reject the work ethic
or prefer welfare to work. Combining these findings and con-
dusions with the evidence reported above that extensive WIN
efforts over the years have failed to make a dent in the national
welfare rolls, suggests that there are structural, hard-to-change
patterns in our society which lead millions of families on to the
welfare rolls.
If the above analysis is valid, then, further efforts at work-
training along the models already seen should be futile. If the
above analysis is invalid, then, innovative work-training efforts
should produce a dramatic dedine in welfare rolls. The Reagan
Administration proposed to demonstrate this dramatic dedine
by phasing out WIN and allocating money to the states to de-
velop their own imaginative work-training efforts (Comptroller
General, 1982, p. 61). These aims were included in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. At issue is what has
been the results of training welfare recipients during the period
from 1981-1987.
Work-Training Up To Date
The 1981 legislation made it possible for states to require
welfare recipients to work for their welfare grants in a Com-
munity Work Experience Program (CWEP). States also could
fund on-the-job-training by using the welfare grant as a wage
subsidy with a private employer, or they could mount their own
WIN Demonstration Program. Numbers of states took advan-
tage of these opportunities. What happened?
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The first fact to note is that the welfare rolls have not dra-
matically declined. In 1987, there were 3,788,000 families on
public welfare as compared with 3,841,000 in 1981 (WIN Office,
1987). The further question is whether particular kinds of efforts
made by certain states have shown remarkable results or reveal
the possibility of achieving dramatic state or national changes
in the welfare rolls?
This question can be answered by the work of MDRC which
contracted with 11 states to evaluate their efforts. One of the
more successful efforts was in San Diego. It involved mandatory
participation of welfare recipients in a job-search workshop fol-
lowed by individual job search, as well as up to 12 weeks work
experience in public or private nonprofit agencies. After a period
of 15 months persons who received these services were com-
pared with persons who had been assigned to a control group
without those services. One might expect some positive impact
here since emphasis on job search had been shown to improve
employability in the Louisville WIN Lab study in the "job dub"
study.
Results showed a significant difference between members
of the control group and those who received services. The latter
had statistically significant higher levels of employment and
earnings, along with lower welfare payments. However, the ab-
solute magnitude of these differences was small. Thus average
total earnings over a period of 15 months was $700 more for the
group receiving services. Increased earnings of less than $50 per
month are unlikely to have a dramatic effect on the welfare rolls.
The total average reduction in welfare payments over a period
of 18 months was $288. This level of decline does not indicate
dramatic welfare savings (Gueron, 1987, pp. 16, 24).
Efforts in some other states showed no difference at all be-
tween those receiving services and those in the control group.
This was true in West Virginia where the unemployment rate
was so high that the possibility of welfare recipients obtaining
a job was extremely low. One conclusion drawn from the study
is that "although programs produced changes, the magnitude of
those changes was relatively modest ... Thus, while it is worth-
while to operate these programs, they will not move substantial
numbers of people out of poverty" (Gueron, 1987, p. 29).
Those conclusions are remarkably similar to those reached
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in an earlier MDRC experiment that involved supported work
for welfare mothers. In that case, the mothers were placed in
subsidized employment for a period of time with their subse-
quent earnings compared to earning of welfare mothers in a
control group. While there was a significant difference in earn-
ings, it only amounted to $77 per month (Masters & Maynard,
1981, p. 108).
All the findings presented suggest that the WIN experience
from 1968-1981 has been reproduced during 1981-1987. Some
efforts are better able than others to help welfare recipients
achieve economic independence, but these efforts are not able
to make any significant impact on the welfare rolls.
Improvement in job markets can have a positive impact on
welfare rolls. This is not a panacea, however. The State of Mas-
sachusetts is a case in point. In 1974 there were 330,000 persons
on public welfare when the unemployment rate was 7.2% (Sta-
tistical Abstracts of the United States: 1976, p. 362). In 1987,
with the unemployment rate around 3%, there were still 233,000
persons on public welfare. The overall national number of wel-
fare recipients was about 11,000,000 at both times (WIN Office,
1987). The Massachusetts welfare rolls have been substantially
depleted but are by no means negligible. This in spite of the
fact that Massachusetts has heavily invested in training for wel-
fare recipients (Nightingale, 1987, p. 112).
An unexpected problem arises when the economy is good
and unemployment is low. The cost of housing rises. In the city
of Worcester, for example, where this author resides, the cost of
housing has doubled and tripled in the past few years. Welfare
grants have not nearly kept pace (O'Hare, 1987, p. 30). Those
on welfare today are less able to find adequate housing, or any
housing, than they were earlier.
The welfare phenomenon does not stem from one cause that
can be remedied in a quick and simple way. Welfare rolls will
not totally disappear when services are put in place or when the
unemployment rate dips. Low level of skills, chronic illness, neg-
ative experiences in the educational and job market systems as
well as in housing and living situations that promote family
disruption and psychological discouragement cannot be easily
overcome.
Effectiveness of any welfare reform depends in large part
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upon the amount of resources allocated to the efforts prescribed
and the understanding of powerful members of the Donor and
Constituency Systems about the goals of a welfare program. If
these goals center around a cost-benefit lowering of welfare
spending in the next year or two, the legislation will tend to be
punitive and seriously underfunded as was the WIN Program.
If goals center around the long-term development of human
resources the program will be adequately funded and aimed at
helping disadvantaged people make use of opportunities for
achieving economic independence. It is necessary for the federal
government to provide substantial resources here, since, as
Nightingale (1987, p. 113) has indicated, many of the States are
not able to support extensive work-training efforts. How does
the 1988 welfare reform measure up to these issues?
Welfare Reform 1988
In December, 1987 the House of Representatives passed a
surprisingly farsighted Family Welfare Reform Act, H.R. 1720.
It included virtually all the services that have been tried in the
past: remedial education and education for the high school
equivalency certificate; job search; skill training and on-the-job
training; community work experience training; counselling for
personal and family problems; job development; supportive ser-
vices such as child care and Medicaid even after leaving welfare
(Family Welfare Reform Act of 1987, pp. 41-43).
The efforts were to be funded for a period of five years at a
total of more than $7 billion. The bill also gave strong emphasis
to systematic evaluation of program efforts through an inter-
agency panel, an outside advisory board, and $20 million in
funding (Family Welfare Reform Act of 1987, pp. 125-126).
A very shortsighted welfare reform bill, S. 1511 was intro-
duced in the Senate. The two versions went to a joint House-
Senate Conference Committee in the Spring, 1988. At the end
of September, 1988 the Conference Report emerged and then
became law (PL 100-998). The imaginative portions of the House
bill, including the adequate funding, had been scuttled. About
$3.34 billion was to be provided over a period of five years. As
Rep. Major Owens (NY) pointed out in the House debate, "Ac-
cording to CBO (Congressional Budget Office) in real dollars,
WIN
this bill will provide about half of what we spent on the WIN
Job Training Program for welfare recipients during the 1970s"
(1988). If WIN was unsuccessful in lowering the welfare rolls,
spending less on training cannot reasonably be expected to pro-
vide better results.
The negative attitude of the compromise bill toward devel-
oping the human potential of welfare recipients is illustrated in
Rep. Augustus Hawkins' (CA) remark about the weakening of
the House provision for postsecondary education counting as
job preparation: "Obviously, most welfare recipients are not
ready for college, but the opportunity should never be foreclosed
to those who have the motivation and capability" (1988). The
final legislation is not looking toward long-term development of
human resources, but rather to short-term saving of money.
There will not of course be real saving as more parents and their
children are unable to gain the skills to move out of poverty and
welfare.
Also lost in the compromise bill was the imaginative ap-
proach to research and evaluation. These endeavors are now
placed in traditional fashion solely under the discretion of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is responsible for
the entire welfare effort. It is possible that even under these
conditions the research efforts pioneered by the WIN Program
could be expanded.
A picture could be presented of what is happening in the
different social systems involved in the welfare effort (see Fig-
ure 1). A broad evaluation study could be undertaken of work-
training in different locales, considering administrative arrange-
ments and socio-environmental factors such as employment re-
quirements of local industries following the lead of Mitchell,
Chadwin, and Nightingale (1980). Such a study could be en-
hanced by ethnographic accounts at the same sites of how wel-
fare participants made use of the services and training in the
context of their family/community systems.
Overall results would not only reveal the general impact of
work-training on job placement of welfare recipients, but would
provide detailed information on the kinds of events in local of-
fices and in the lives of welfare recipients that promoted or hind-
ered job efforts. This information could be used by members of
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the administrative and delivery systems to improve the program
and to members of Congress for possible changes in legislative
mandate or level of funding.
A legislative and administrative history of the overall pro-
gram could be carried forward. This material would help mem-
bers of all systems, especially those who were new to the scene,
to understand the assumptions guiding different aspects of the
program and the views held by members of different systems.
In short, an integrated set of ongoing research studies that cut
across traditional academic and methodological boundaries could
facilitate the functioning of a national effort to help welfare re-
cipients achieve economic independence. It also could point up
the shortcomings of current efforts.
Summary and Condusions
Welfare policies and programs have changed since their in-
ception. In 1935 the emphasis was on providing support for
widows to stay at home and look after their children. In the
1960s, as welfare rolls increased, emphasis shifted to providing
counselling and work-training for unwed mothers so that they
could obtain employment and leave welfare.
The WIN Program in its initial phase of 1968-71 emphasized
education and training. This resulted in relatively few job place-
ments because the participants required such extensive efforts
in those regards. Pressure built up for more job placements in
order to lower the welfare rolls and welfare costs. The emphasis
for immediate job placement increased from 1972-81, but even
so the welfare rolls remained at around 11,0000,000 persons.
If the WIN Program did not resolve the welfare problem, by
1981 it had undertaken a wide variety of activities aimed at that
goal, including establishment of WIN Laboratories, demonstra-
tion projects such as job dubs, and research into such matters
as the attitudes of welfare recipients and the administrative and
socio-environmental context of WIN offices. Overall results in-
dicated that the welfare problem could not be blamed on recip-
ients having deviant goals or values-the latter were much like
those of other Americans. Nor could the problem be attributed
to lack of trying various kinds of work-training efforts, or ad-
ministrative difficulties.
WIN
Work-training efforts were continued under a more varied
format with the 1981 legislation, giving States a larger role in
determining the activities to be undertaken. Research carried
out on those activities yield essentially the same results as from
WIN: work-training is useful, but in itself will not deplete the
welfare rolls.
The welfare rolls continue at around 11,000,000 persons-
over 3.5 million families of whom about 95% are headed by
mothers-because of structural, hard-to-change patterns in our
society. These patterns involve the educational system, organi-
zation of the job market, housing and living situations, and fac-
tors promoting family disruption. These social structural
difficulties that encourage failure in the job market do have psy-
chological consequences, lowering the expectations of ever suc-
ceeding. This in turn lowers effort. Thus there is an interplay
between experience and psychological orientations that affect
behavior.
A program that has any hope of lowering welfare rolls must
have a long-range perspective. It must be aimed not merely at
immediate job placement but at helping compensate for social
patterns that have led to inequities in personal background and
experiences. Of particular importance is helping poor fathers
(who are not on welfare) to obtain employment so that there is
greater chance of their staying with and supporting their families.
The new welfare law does not move beyond the thinking or
experience of the WIN Program. There are some positive ele-
ments, such as, extension of child care and Medicaid beyond
the welfare period and stronger provision for obtaining family
support from absent fathers. However, the centerpiece of the
effort, the work-training aspect, is so woefully underfunded as
to provide even worse results than the WIN Program it replaces.
No provision is made for upgrading welfare payments that have
fallen farther and farther below the poverty level.
There is some encouragement in the fact that the House of
Representatives was able to pass a welfare reform bill that con-
tained the seeds of a new evolutionary phase in welfare pro-
grams. Those seeds may come to fruition at a later time when
we finally recognize that helping the poor is helping to expand
not deplete resources of our nation.
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